Towards a results-based performance management: practices and challenges in the Ethiopian public sector by Debela, T & Hagos, A





Towards a results-based performance management: practices and 
challenges in the Ethiopian public sector 
 




The purpose of this research is to propose a strategy of managing performance in the public 
sector. The primary data have been collected through questionnaires administered to 
managers and professionals; and interviews administered to heads of planning and ICT 
departments. Secondary data were collectedthrough reviewing documents (plans, reports, 
proclamations and regulation). Findings of this study indicate that performance 
management system is disconnected at the top that weakened accountability of managers in 
the public sector. Besides, agencies responsible for performance management have not 
developed systems to monitor and evaluate performances of public organisations and their 
managers. As a matter of fact, public organisations have made a lot of progress in 
introducing LAN, developing web pages and using the int rnet for information sharing. 
However, they have not developed database systems and computerized MIS that are 
important for the management of performance. The other problem of managing 
performance in the public sector is the different agencies that are directly or indirectly 
involved in managing the performance of a particular public organisation. These are: first, 
the organisation itself, which is striving to implem nt BSC; second, the Planning and 
Budgeting unit of MoFED, which has not gone beyond the traditional activities of 
compiling plans and performance reports of public organisations, but attempting to 
implement Performance Based Budgeting, and finally, the Ministry of Civil Service, which 
is responsible for preparing guidelines for evaluation of employee performance. To 
emphasise the importance of performance management in the public sector, the Ethiopian 
government can learn from the experiences of some African countries, which have 
organised performance management units under the offic s of Prime Ministers. 
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Starting from 1993, the civil service reform has passed through two major 
phases. The first phase was between 1993 and 1998, when the civil service 
organisations were being restructured to fit the thn introduced Federal 
Political System of Administration. The second phase was between the year 
2000 and 2011 when the government was focussing on enhancing the 
capacity of civil service employees by providing short term trainings on 
different topics of management.  
 
During the first phase, one of the objectives was to reassign the civil service 
employees, organised under unitary state, to the newly merging federal 
states and the other objective was to improve the efficiency of public service 
delivery. Nevertheless, the restructuring of civil service organisations were 
not systematic.  For example, in the mid-1994, the Ministry of Agriculture, 
Water Resource Commission (which consisted of Water Resource 
Development Authority and Water Supply and Sewerage Authority) and 
Ethiopian Valleys Development Studies Authority (EVDSA) were merged 
to form the Ministry of Natural Resources and Environmental Protection 
(MNREP). But in mid-1995, the government reversed its decisions of 
merging and divided again the MNREP into three independent 
organisations, namely: Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development, 
Ministry of Water Resources and Environmental Protection Authority.   
 
During the adjustment program, the government merged M DAC (Ministry 
of Economic Development and Cooperation) and Ministry of Finance to 
form MoFED (Ministry of Finance and Economic Development); and 
introduced additional new institutions like Ministry of Capacity Building, 





Ministry of Revenue (separated from Ministry of Finance), Ministry of the 
Federal Government, Ministry of Infrastructure and Ministry of Rural 
Development (Ethiopian Herald, 2001).   
 
The second phase of the reform started in late 1990s and the government 
hired a consultant group to study the problems of the civil service. The 
group recommended that the Ethiopian Civil Service R form needed to 
focus on improving the capacity of the top Management System, civil 
service ethics, efficiency of service delivery, expnditure management and 
capacity of human Resource Management. All these five components of the 
Civil Service Reform Programmes were considered crucial in creating 
accountable and responsible civil service that can promote the development 
effort of the country. 
 
The government adopted the implementation of Result Based Performance 
Management System (RBPM) in the public sector. However, implementing 
RBPMS in the Ethiopian civil service has not been easy.  During the second 
phase, two attempts were made. The first performance management system 
was focusing on the “contract” relationship between the supervisor and the 
employee without first making the management of the organisation 
accountable for fulfilling the strategic objectives of the organisation. This 
was more of Management by Objective (MBO). This view didn’t explicitly 
state from where the supervisor could get the performance standards and 
how the performances of top, middle and operational level managers can be 
measured. As a result, the notion missed the simple logic of cascading the 
strategies of an organisation downward to the individual level performance. 
This recommendation allowed the then management to ge  a leeway to 
throw the “ball” down to the employees despite the fact that the scope of 





performance management passes the boundary of individual and supervisor 
relationship. This implies the importance of measuring performance at 
organization level, at department or team level and t individual level. This 
causes accountability of performance to fall upon the management of public 
organization, and this management would assume the responsibility of 
dividing organizational works among divisions and iividuals.  
 
In the second attempt, the government selected some ministries to try and 
test RBPM. In fact many public organisations have slightly improved their 
performance in providing the public with efficient services. However, until 
this day, it is difficult to judge whether the lesson  obtained from the 
experiences of these Ministries would be transferred to other Ministries.  In 
order to pave the way for RBPMS, the government star ed to reorganise its 
civil service organisations in the year 2004 using BPR as strategic tool. 
Even if the implementation of BPR has controversial results across civil 
service organisations with different missions, researches indicate that BPR 
is effective to improve the efficiency of some civil service organisations 
engaged in service delivery (see Tesfaye, 2009,Tesfay  and Atakilt, 2011). 
Now the government has introduced balanced scorecard as a performance 
measurement tool in the public sector.  
 
Objectives and specific questions of the research 
 
The objectives of this research is to determine the challenges of government 
organizations in implementing Result Based Performance Management 
(RBPM)by addressing the following specific questions 
 





1. How much has the government relaxed its input and process control, 
how much are managers empowered to decide on the resources 
allocated to their unit? 
2. What is the capacity of the government (MoFED or MoCS) to plan 
and expect results from public organisations, to make public 
managers responsible and accountable for their organisational/Unit 
performance? 
3. To what extent have the civil service organisations established MIS 
systems that enable managers to monitor and evaluate performances 
in their organisations? 
 
Scope and significance of the study 
 
This study addresses the conceptual issues of result based performance 
management in the public sector related to empowerment of managers, 
accountability, performance systems and management capacity. In terms of 
time scope, this study is a cross-sectional study that focussed on the status of 
performance management in public organisations in the year 2011. The 
geographical scope is Federal Ministries and Enterprises operating in Addis 
Ababa. Finally, this study helps policy makers to consider new dimensions 
of implementing result based performance management sys em in the 
country. 
 
A review of the literature 
 
Result based performance evaluation began at the beginning of the 20th 
century when Taylor and Gantt measured performance by associating it with 
differential rate and bonus payment systems. Thus, private sector-industries 





used result based performance evaluations much earlier than the public 
sector. Performance management in the modern world has wider scope than 
it was at the time of Taylor and Gant because the modern thinking of social 
responsibility requires private and public organisation to respect citizens and 
to provide ethical services to clients. 
 
Smith and Goddard(2002: 247) noted that performance management has 
four fundamental building blocks. They are formulation of strategy; 
identification of indicators to measure performance; the capacity of 
management to analyse and interpret the performance measures; and the 
incentives designed to encourage appropriate organizational responses to 
performance information.  
 
Hood (1991)  discusses the major principles of performance management in 
public sector are efficient utilisation of resources; mpowered public sector 
managers to make hands on decision; control focussed on outputs/results 
instead of inputs and activities; and measurement of performance to enhance 
accountability. The discussion of Hood (1991) can be viewed from two 
perspective of NPM, i.e., from outcome and strategic perspectives. From 
outcome perspective, public organisations are expected to be efficient, 
flexible, accountable and effective in their performances and, from strategic 
perspective public organisations need to introduce private firm style 
management, to change input/activity based control to output/result based 
control. However, the implementation of private firm like management in 
public organisations may become questionable becaus the ownership right 
in private organisations is different from the ownership right in public 
organisations. A good example of this is the effect of the financial crisis on 





the outlook of some politicians on the issue of NPM in the advanced 
countries. 
 
Models of performance management system 
 
There are a lot of models such as vertical and horizontal integration systems, 
the critical few factors, Strategic Business Framework, etc. developed for 
managing performance in the public sector. However, ou  research focuses 
on applying Log frame analysis and BSC as they are widely used in 
Ethiopia.  
 
The traditional Log Frame (logical framework) analysis, started around the 
early 1960s in the US, divided results in three leve s. The first is the output, 
the second is outcome and the third is impact. Challenging the traditional 
performance management that focuses on the financial perspectives Kaplan 
and Norton (1996)  developed the balanced scorecard (BSC) model that 
facilitate the management of performances of organisations towards 
achieving objectives drawn from four perspectives – financial, customer, 
internal process and growth and learning. 
 
Behn (2003:598) stressed that there is no simple and e sy way to identify 
best performance measure because they require relevant yardstick, 
understanding of the context and political complexiti s within and outside 
the organization. Banker et al (2004:20-22) highlight that availability of key 
(strategic) information for decision helps decision makers to come up with 
‘strategically linked’ performance measures than taking common measures 
to evaluate performance. They suggested an understanding of linkages 
among the different elements of the strategy as a precondition to the 





identification and reliance on strategically linked performance measures. 
Libby et al (2004:1091) also promote a similar idea suggesting that senior 
management should require divisional managers to justify their performance 
evaluations so that they can use all relevant information in evaluating 
performance using both common and unique performance measures in the 
BSC.  
 
Akkermans and Oorschot (2005:940) reported that BSC allowed managers 
in Dutch Insurer Inter polis to arrive at both financial and non-financial 
performance measures. Based on the experience of Services Inc., Reisinger 
et al (2003:436) provide the rationale for periodic revision of BSC and the 
prioritization of performance measures. According to hem, such 
prioritization serves the company management as a communication tool and 





Accountability involves the justifications of decisions and actions, and the 
managerial answerability of the implementation of agreed tasks according to 
the agreed criteria of performance (ECA, 2003). In addition to 
answerability, accountability includes the obligation of the manager, team or 
individual to report on the results achieved and to assume liability for those 
results (Artley et al, 2001: 21). Hence, we can derive three important 
variables that allow us to measure accountability. They are the 
performance agreements made between the public organisation and the 
government and between management and different individuals down the 
hierarchy of the organisation, the r porting relationship existing between 





the parties in the organisation and the consequences that may arise as a 
result of good or bad performance. 
 
Performance management requires the empowerment of managers to make 
effective operational and strategic decisions. Effectiv  performance 
management also increases accountability because clear managerial targets 
together with managerial autonomy makes the public manager to be 
concerned on achieving outputs and results (Hills and Gillespie 1996, Lane 
1995, in ECA, 2003).   
 
Therefore, it can be summarised that accountability in the public sector 
depends on the product of three variables- performance agreement, 
performance reporting, and consequence on the results of performance 
evaluation reports. Therefore, if one of these three variables is missed then 
existence of accountability becomes questionable. 
 
Performance controlling (monitoring and evaluation) systems 
 
As an agent of the government, the top management of specific public 
organisation needs to have a monitoring and evaluation systems to manage 
the performances of its different divisions. One of the strategies may be to 
create accounting and performance auditing systems. In this connection, one 
of the focuses of the reform in the public sector was to change the single 
entry accounting system to double entry accounting system. The assumption 
is that the adoption of accrual accounting radically reforms the financial 
accountability of public sector managers and facilitates availability of 
financial information to the public (ECA 2003). In Ethiopia, MoFED has 
introduced the modified cash basis accounting instead of accrual basis 





accounting because of the problem of valuing the assets of civil service 
organisations. 
Goddard and Mannion (2004) have argued that performance measurement 
systems incorporate a blend of both vertical and horizontal approaches. 
According to them, vertical approaches are important for successful 
achievements of key central targets that are essential for implementing 
public policy. The measurements of the few performance indicators help to 
identify and reward/punish outliers in the performance distribution. On the 
other hand, horizontal approaches facilitate performance improvement in the 
organisation through continuous learning and through encouraging the use 
of performance data by front-line staff. 
 
Similarly, Smith and Goddard (2002) discussed two approach of 
performance measurement the cross-sectional approach th t compares the 
performance data of one organisation/unit to that of other comparable 
organization; and the longitudinal approach that measures the performance 
improvement of a single organization through time.  
 
To strengthen their performance management, many countries have started 
to invest in ICT for enhancing good governance in the public sector. For 
example Ethiopia has established ICTDA, an agent responsible to expand 
the use of ICT in Ethiopia. Therefore, ICT is one of the key strategic issues 
in the public sector performance management. In BSC, once the indicators 
to measure performance from the perspectives of finance, citizens service, 
internal process and organisational growth are ident fi d, the use of 
computerised information systems in the public sector becomes vital  to 
improve the efficiency of public service delivery, the capacity of 





management to manage performance, and enhance accountability and 
transparency in the public sector (ECA 2003). Thus, public organisations 
need to create databases for their different functio s and to integrate the 
database to enhance the capacity of management to manage performance 
information. 
 
Empirical evidences in public sector performance management 
 
Considering the experiences of other countries in implementing result based 
performance management in the civil service helps to understand the 
distance that the Ethiopian Civil Service needs to travel to transform itself 
from the highly bureaucratic form of control to result form of control.  We 
would try to review this from the perspective of the experience of western 
countries and from the perspective of the experience of African countries. 
 
Experience of western countries 
 
Western countries started to reform their civil service organisations in early 
1980s with the objective of creating transparent and ccountable civil 
service organisations for which their performance can be evaluated based on 
the results they produce rather than on the inputs they consume (Flynn and 
Strehl, 1996). However, Wilks (1996: 35) argue that measuring and 
evaluating public sector performances have been difficult even for many 
European countries.  
 
The crusade for result oriented performance management in the public 
sector was led by Great Britain and New Zealand (Naschold, 1996:1).  The 





main reasons that led governments in developed countries to adopt result 
based performance management for the public sector were: 
 The economic decline and increased international competition 
necessitated the need for reduction in the expenditure of the public 
sector, 
 The public dissatisfaction with the bureaucracy, 
 The advancement in information technology forced a ch nge in the 
structure of government bureaucracy, 
 
According to Smith (1990), UK had taken successive measures to establish 
indicators of performance in its public sector organis tions between the year 
1978 and 1985. The measures included requiring public organisations to 
manage performance data and the publication of annual performance 
reports. However, as cited in Smith (1990), Mayston (1985),and Smith and 
Ashley Smith (1987) found that authorities were superficially making 
reports attractive and that there was  little evidence to prove that public 
organisations were making comparisons of performances in their annual 
reports. In addition, Smith (1990) noted almost all public organisations were 
using input measures such as unit costs or manpower ratios to measure 
performances. 
 
When we relate the experiences of western countries to Ethiopia, managers 
in the public sector emphasized on quantity, quality, time and cost to 
measure and manage performance. However, time and cost measure the 
process and the inputs respectively; whereas quantity and quality measure 
both inputs and outputs. As a result, the Ethiopian c vil service organisations 
have been succumbed once again into measuring activities and inputs 
instead of measuring results (Tesfaye, 2009).  





Reviewing the experiences of implementing result based performance 
management by some advanced countries suggests that they have taken 
substantial measures to make public sector organisation  flexible in their 
operation and accountable for their action.  For example Australia, Canada, 
USA and many European countries have relaxed their input control (making 
organisations autonomous in the use of resources), reduced process controls, 
have created autonomous organisations, allowed managers to manage their 
risks(OECD, 1996) 
 
Experience of some African countries 
 
As to developing countries, it was the pressure of international financial 
institutions to restructure their civil service organisations. During the 1980s, 
African countries were suffering from the growing burden of external debts, 
rapid population growth, continuous drought and protracted internal 
conflicts (ECA, 2003: 2). Structural Adjustment Programme was initiated in 
the mid-1980s with the objective of reducing the role f the state in 
production activities and service provision. Since the 1980s, the 
international organisations including their allies have initiated different 
major programmes (see Box 1) that they believed would change the African 
economic condition.  





Box 1Box 1: chronology of establishing African reform institutions  
 
1. In 1980, Lagos Plan of Action for the Economic Development of Africa with 
the objective of restructuring the economy of Africa based on the principles 
of National and collective self reliance and self sustaining development.  
2. In 1985, the African Priority Programme for Economic Recovery (APPER) 
with the objective of reducing external debt burden a d preparing a 
common platform for action at regional, sub regional and international 
level.  
3. In 1986, The United Nations Plan of Action for African Economic Recovery 
and Development (UN-PAAERD), with the aim of establishing the 
foundations for structural transformation, increased productivity and 
general improvement of African economies. 
4. In 1991, The United Nations New Agenda for the Development of Africa in 
the 1990s (UN-NADAF) with the objective of transformation, integration 
and diversification of African economies so as to srengthen them as 
partners in world trade and to reduce their vulnerability to external shocks. 
Also, recognizing that greater access to world markets would allow Africa 
to exploit their comparative advantage while opening up to international 
competition. 
5. In 2000, the United Nations adopted the Millennium Development Goals 
(MDGs) with the aim of eradication of extreme poverty and hunger, 
achieving universal primary education and the development of a global 
partnership for development.  
6. The priorities outlined in the New Partnership for Africa’s Development 
(NEPAD) include good governance, economic growth, mobilization of 
resources, global partnerships, environmental protection, poverty 
reduction, and investment in human resources. 
Source: United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA), 
2003: 2-3 





The recent economic, social, political and technological changes have 
shaped the nature and pace of public sector reform in Africa (ECA, 2003:2-
3). Ohemeng (2005:442-445) also argues that the local ideas have had their 
role in the implementation of the New Public Management (NPM) and in 
shaping administrative reforms in Ghana. In addition, the decentralization of 
management to field work employees in Uganda Wildlife Authority, the 
decentralization and performance contracting in Ghana’s Community Water 
Supply Agency (CWSA), where CWSA enters annual performance contract 
with the State Enterprise Commission (World Bank 2002 cited in ECA 
2003) were among the major experiences in implementing RBPMS in 
Africa.  
 
Ghana is one of the countries which implemented Results-Oriented 
Performance Management System in Africa. A study by Oudro (2003: xi) 
indicates that every ministry, department or agency i  Ghana has developed 
mission statements, objectives, outputs and activities and developed a 
budget system to translate the strategic plans into action. According to 
Oudro (2003), the performance management system is supported by a 
Results-Oriented Expenditure Management System. The shortcoming of 
public expenditure management system, according to Oduro (2003), are 
weak budget formulation, implementation, monitoring and evaluation; poor 
data generation and dissemination; poor flow of information between banks 
and the Ministry of Finance; deficiencies in accounting and auditing; weak 
regulatory capacity and obsolete financial management laws; too many 
government accounts; and, low level of awareness among government 
employees.  
 





In general, the major challenges of performance management reform in 
Africa are inadequate institutional capacity, inadequate human resource 
capacity, declining public service ethics, declining social values, declining 
civil service morale and limited access to ICTs. In addition to these 
challenges, government organisations in developing countries suffer from 
multiple accountabilities as a result of conflict of political, managerial, 
public and financial accountabilities; and conflicting expectations from the 
public and the political bosses (ECA, 2003: 33).Despit  the aforementioned 
problems, many African countries such as Botswana, Ghana, South Africa 
and Uganda have continued to implement the new performance 
management system in their public sector.  
 
In addition, many authors argue that the effort of measuring outputs in the 
public sector has resulted with confusing consequences  because Auditors 
reports were focussing on procedures rather than on actual results of public 
organisations (Thiel and Leeuw, 2002, Leeuw, 2000, OECD, 1996); the 
ambiguousness of policy objectives (Wilson, 1989:32-3 ) and performance 
indicators have been subject to different interpretation between politicians 
themselves and between politicians and managers (McGuire, 2001). The 
problem of using too many indicators or the inability to identify the 
appropriate  indicators of performance, high expectation and high ambitious 
plans with lack of organisational capacity are also the major challenges in 
public organizations. 
 





The Ethiopian experience: structural change strategies in the public 
sector 
 
A government may think four strategies in restructuring its public sector 
organisations. These strategies are decentralisation, commercialising 
services, privatisation and management contracting. Restructuring 
organisation may lead to downsizing of employees. For example, since 
1987, Ghana, Uganda and Zimbabwe have reduced their civil service 
employees by 50%, 40% and 12% respectively (ECA, 2003). The following 
are some of the measures, in terms of structural/ownership changes, taken 
by the Ethiopian government to improve performance i  the public sector: 
 
Decentralisation: this is a process of creating autonomous organisations, 
increasing managerial autonomy by reducing the administrative controls 
through the devolution of budgets and financial controls, creating new forms 
of corporate governance and board of director’s model for restructured 
public service organisations, and the right to hire and fire employees. To 
separate executive functions from policy-making and free managers from 
civil service rules and conditions, the Customs and Excise, and Internal 
Revenue Departments of Ghana and Uganda were  totally separated from 
the civil service to form separate agencies in the 1980s (ECA, 2003). 
Similar to Ghana and Uganda, Ethiopia has established Ethiopian Revenue 
and Customs Authority (ERCA) by merging the Ethiopian Customs 
Authority, the Ethiopian Inland Revenue and the Ministry of Revenue. 
ERCA has been granted autonomy starting from the year 2008 (Buyonge, 
2008, Tesfaye and Atakilt, 2011). ERCA can expand or c ntract its 
organisation structure, design its own salary scale and have its own 
regulation for personnel administration. 





Commercialising public enterprises:  This is a process of creating a public 
enterprise that can operate in the market and compete with other public 
organisations and private companies. An example of this type of 
organisation is the Ethiopian Airlines, which has survived the global 
competition in airlines business since its establishment in 1945. Similarly, 
Ethiopian Roads Authority (ERA)had two wings-  the operational wing 
which was engaged in construction of roads and the supervision and 
administration wing, which was engaged in administration and control. As a 
result of BPR, the former operational wing, which was engaged in 
construction of roads, emerged as Ethiopian Road Construction Corporation 
with a 1.5 billion birr capital to compete in the road market. The other wing 
emerged as ERA, which plays a supervisory and regulatory role on behalf of 
the government. Another example is the Water Works Design and 
Supervision Enterprise (WWDSE), which ceded from the former Ministry 
of Water Resources and became an autonomous commercializ d public 
enterprise, with a mission of providing consultancy services in water 
resources development, in October 1998 
 
Privatisation: sale or leasing of some government services believing that 
these firms can be more efficient if they are in the hands of private firms 
than being in the hands of the state. Since its establi hment in 1995, the 
Ethiopian Privatisation agency has transferred many public enterprises to 
the private sector. In the years between 1995 and 2005, among the308 
enterprises floated, 214 (69.5%) of them have been transferred to the private 
sector (accessed on February 9, 2011). Other state own d enterprises are 
also under the process of auction and transfer. 
 





Contract out/management contracting: This can be  a process of arranging 
contractual agreement between the government and the management of 
public agencies or ministries. In this, the governme t and the management 
of an agent specify the standards of performance or quantifiable targets that 
should be accomplished over a stated period of time(ECA 2003: 20). For 
example, the contracting of rural water supply in Ghana was successful 
(ECA, 2003). Contracting can also be management contracts by which the 
government out sources the management but retains the ownership right of 
the organisation. The Ethiopian government outsourced the management of 
Ethiopian Telecommunication Corporation (ETC) to a French company 
since November 2010. Currently, the government denied second renewal of 
the contract. Contracting clearly is in line with agency theory that proposes 





Variables used in the assessment: Performance management is a function 
of management capacity and organizational factors. O ganisational factors 
can be organisation specific factors and general/external factors. The 
variables for organisation specific factors are the pr paration and cascading 
of plans to different units of the organisation; accountability, empowerment 
and responsibility of division heads and professionals; and the readiness of 
Civil Service Organisations to use MIS for performance management. The 
variables for general factors are the frameworks, rules and regulations 
related to planning, budgeting, performance reporting, employee 
recruitment, resource procurement and expenditure management and 
contractual arrangement for managing organisational performance.  





Sources and methods of data collection: We have used both primary and 
secondary data of quantitative (scale and ordinal) and qualitative nature. The 
data was collected in January and February, 2011. The primary data was 
collected through questionnaire and interview. The quationnaire has been 
administered to managers, department/division heads, section heads, team 
leaders and professional employees working in Ministry of Finance and 
Economic Development (MoFED), Ministry of Civil Service (MoCS), 
Ministry of Water and Energy (MoWE), Ministry of Agriculture (MoA), 
Ministry of Industry (MoI), Ethiopian Civil Service University (ECSU), 
Water Works and Design Supervision Enterprise (WWSDE) and Addis 
Ababa Transport Branch Office (AATBO).A structured interview was 
administered to heads of planning and ICT departments. The researchers 
made personal observation to check the availability and quality of database 
systems, softwares and web pages of the public organizations. The 
secondary data was collected from strategic plan and performance report 
documents, financial and human resource proclamations, rules and 
regulations related to assess the regulatory enviroment on public 
procurement and human resource recruitment.  
 
Sampling and sample size: The researchers used purposive sampling to 
represent public organisations with different mission  in the study. MoFED 
and MoCS were included as they regulate planning/budgeting and human 
resource management respectively. In addition, MoWE, MoI and MoA were 
selected to assess the performance management system  of policy 
implementing federal organizations.  AATBO was purposely selected to 
obtain highlights on performance management systems of bureaus in Addis 
Ababa City Administration.  Particularly, MoA, AATBO, ECSU and 
MoWE were among the few public organizations that were selected to 





implement BSC. Finally, autonomous and commercialized public 
enterprises are represented by WWSDE A total of 73 respondents from the 
seven organizations filled the questionnaire and eight planning/ICT heads 
were interviewed.  
 
Table 1: Composition of respondents by position 
 








  Total 73 
           Source: Own Servey 
 
 The managers (directors department/division heads, section heads and team 
leaders) were included purposively. Table 1summarizes the distribution of 
the respondents by organization.  
 
Method of data analysis: This research employed qualitative and 
quantitative methods of data analysis. Mainly descriptive statistics,such as 
tables, is employed in analyzing the quantitative data. Qualitative method of 
analysis is usedto analyze the performance managment relationship that 
exists between the government and specific public organizations; the 
relationship that exists between an organization  and its different units; and, 





the national systems and legal frameworks governing performance 
managment in public organizations.  
 
Data analysis and results 
 
Since 1992, the government has been taking different policy and 
administrative measures to enhance the performance of the economy in 
general and that of the public sector, in particular. Some of these measures 
can be changes in rules and regulations to relax input control, enhancing 
systems and organisational capacities, and the introduction of different tools 
to reform public service. The authors analyse to what extent these conditions 
were amenable in implementing RBPM 
 
Degree of relaxation of inputs/process control 
 
One of the conditions that we raised in the literature is the extent that the 
government has relaxed its input control. In this, we raise two important 
inputs of public organisations. These are the materials resources, which 
require financial control, and the human resource, which require recruitment 
control.  
 
Procurement process control 
 
One of the criteria for RBPM is the extent of the rlaxation of the 
procurement rules and regulations. Previously there was one unit under the 
Ministry of Finance that oversees and processes procurement in public 
organisation. However, in the year 2009the government has established an 
agency called the Public Procurement and Property Administration Agency 





through proclamation No. 649/2009. The agency is reponsible for 
controlling and regulating procurement activities of federal government 
agencies.  
 
Our assessment of changes in rules and regulations for public procurement 
shows that the relaxation of input control is limited to the relaxation of the 
maximum financial ceiling for different methods of procurement (see 
MoFED, 2010).Furthermore, procurement decision is centralised under the 
procurement unit of each federal organisation. However, the directive 
(article 5, sub article 13c) opens a room that the minister/head of the 
government agency can delegate the decision of procurement up to a certain 
limit to unit heads of organisation. However, executives of many federal 
agencies have not delegated part of procurement decisions to their unit 
heads. To substantiate this document review, the res a chers evaluated the 
difference between existing practice of procurement and the preference of 
division/process owners in procurement decision in public organisations. 
Table 2 indicates that 88% of process/division managers responded that 
procurement decisions are made by central procurement unit of the 
organisation whereas only 12% of process/division managers, mainly from 
MoWE, make partial procurement decisions.   
 
With regard to preference in having the power to make procurement 
decisions, only 17% of processes/division managers prefer the centralization 
of procurement activity. The percentage change betwe n the existing 
practice of central procurement and the preference towards centralized 
procurement decision has decreased by 71%. On the other hand, 58% of 
division/process managers prefer the procurement to be decided partly by 
process/division and partly by top management (central procurement unit). 





This is a 45% increase from the existing practice of 12%. On the other 
extreme, 26% of processes/divisions prefer complete decentralization of 
procurement decision to processes/divisions level (seeTable 2).  
 









100% by centre 88% 17% -71% 
Partly by process and partly by the centre 12% 57% +45% 
All by process 0% 26% +26% 
    Source: Own Survey 
 
Therefore, the existing practice of procurement in public organizations 
shows that managers of different units of the organisation are far from 
participating (except attending the bid opening ceremony) in procurement 
decision of their concern. In all cases, they have to wait for the decision of 
the head of the procurement unit even for a purchase of small quantity 
needed by their unit.  
 
Process control: organisation structure and HRM 
 
The human resource plan of any organisation depends o  the strategic 
objectives and strategies of the organisation. This calls for civil service 
organisation to be flexible to contract or expand their human resource need 
based on the volume of work they have. There are three important issues to 
be discussed here. They are the design of organisation structure, recruitment 
and separation of human resource, and the compensatio  ystem in the civil 
service sector.  





As to the expansion and contraction of organisation structure, civil service 
organisations are empowered to study and redesign their organisation 
structure (Article 30: 2 and 3, article 4:1) to retrench employees if the new 
organisation structure creates redundant workforce (Article 83). However, 
MoCS (previously the former Federal Civil Service Agency) is responsible 
for issuing directives regarding staff planning and the design and the 
implementation of the new organisation structure. In addition, MoCS 
requires any civil service organisation to fill the classifications questionnaire 
and submit new positions to the ministry for evaluation and classifications 
(Article 5:1). Therefore, any civil service organisation is responsible to 
implement strategies but not to expand or contract as per to the volume of 
work.  
 
Regarding employee compensation and performance evaluation, it is the 
MoCS  that has the power to study and to design  salary scale of civil 
servants and implement the scale after it obtains approval from the council 
of Ministers (Article 6: 1-4). This indicates that the performance done at a 
specific civil service organisation is separated from the decision to 
compensate that particular performance. This approach weakens the 
implementation of result based performance management system in the civil 
service organisation that requires autonomous, organic and flexible 
organisation structure. The management of the organisation should agree on 
level of performance and appropriate compensation with the employee.   
 
With regard to performance evaluation of employees, the manager of a 
public organisation is responsible to manage performance but MoCS is 
responsible to prepare the guide line for performance evaluation (Article 
31:3).  





In conclusion, both expenditure control and human resource control implies 
the existence of high process control in the civil service that confirms the 
continuation of the bureaucratic system in the civil service for the 
foreseeable future to come. 
 
The levels of managing performance in civil service organisations 
 
Performance management in public organizations can be analysed 
hierarchically at three levels, namely: at organization, process/division and 
team/individual.  
1. At organisational level:  to implement result performance management 
in the civil service sector, the government should have the capacity to 
clearly state what it expects from its managers, the capacity to finance 
the operations of the agencies and the capacity to establish systems 
that make managers accountable for their inefficiency. Systems of 
contract agreement should reflect the responsibility and accountability 
between the two parties  
 
2. At process division level: it is believed that each division or process 
has a share from the strategic plan of the organisation. The 
hierarchical relationship between the organisation and the division is 
established by cascading the strategic plan of the organisation to the 
division level. Hence, the performance of the division can be 
ascertained by explicit or implicit statements of responsibilities 
delegated and the management can evaluate the performance of the 
division that in turn allow us to evaluate the management capacity of 
the process/division managers. 
 





3. At individual level: The division/process is responsible to cascade its 
responsibilities to the team individual level and performance 
agreement is made between the supervisor and the team or the 
individual. 
 
The government tried to train its employees in different performance 
management tools such as Performance Planning and Magement System 
(PPMS), and Strategic Plan and Management (SPM). This enabled most 
public organizations to prepare strategic plans and to craft their mission and 
vision statements. However, the high turnover, which includes those who 
took the training, undermined the capacity of the civil service to implement 
result oriented performance management systems. Recently, the government 
introduced BSC as an integrated performance management system. MoFED 
introduced  Program Budgeting to support the BSC.  
 
Institutional arrangement for managing organisational performance 
 
Since its establishment during Haileselassie era, the central Planning agency 
assumed different names, the last one being MEDAC.  The Ministry of 
Finance (MoF) and the Ministry of Economic Development and 
Cooperation (MEDAC) merged into one Ministry, called MoFED, in 2005.  
The mission of MoFED is “To formulate development policy and plan … 
and to establish efficient and effective system of public finance 
administration”(http://www.mofed.gov.et/index.php;Accessed on: February 
24:2011) MoFED has three major wings now. These are Development 
Planning and Economic Administration Office, Government Finance 
Administration and Control, and Foreign Resource and Income 
Administration Office. Development Planning and Economic 





Administration Office, led by a state minister, is responsible to compile the 
national plan, to allocate budgets and to compile performance reports from 
public organisations. In order to effectively implem nt result based 
performance management system in the public sector, the government 
should have the capacity to manage the implementatio  of the strategic plan 
of the nation and to control the performances of the managers of the public 
organisations as to performance expectation. Therefore, no one can assume 
this responsibility except the economic development wing of MoFED, 
which on behalf of the government can sign performance agreement with 
the federal agencies. The performance agreement should c nsist of the 
performance expected from the public agency, when and where to deliver 
the results and the consequences on the results of the evaluation of the 
performance report.  
 
The use of performance indicators in national planning 
 
One of the requirements for RBPM is the clarity of bjectives and 
performance indicators in the strategic plan. One of such plans, which were 
subject to our scrutiny, was the national strategic plan document – “A plan 
for Accelerated and Sustained Development to End Poverty (PASDEP)” for 
2005 to 2010. Our analysis focused on the identifica on of strategic themes, 
strategic goals, outcomes/outputs and the indicators t  measure the 
performances of public sector organisations. As drawn from the policy 
matrix (MoFED2006), the PASDEP document contains 18 themes, 19 
strategic goals, summary of expected outcomes, outputs and 
inputs/activities. The policy matrix was developed using the traditional log 
frame analysis that starts from the outcome and goes down the hierarchy 
through outputs, inputs/activities and budget preparation. The PASDEP 





policy matrix has indicators of outcome at the national level such as growth 
in Gross Domestic Product, poverty reduction, reduction in mortality rate, or 
other parameters used to measure the economic and social development of 
the country. It also contains sector-specific indicators of outcomes, outputs, 
inputs/activities broken down into annual targets for the five strategic plan 
periods and the responsible agency to implement the s rategy.  Table 3 
contains the number of outcome/output, activities and inputs summarised 
from the policy matrix for few selected organisations to assess the status of 
organisational capacity in having measurable indicators for plans 
formulated. 
 
Table 3: Summary of indicators in the PASDEP 
Organisation 









Total number of 
measurable 
indicators 
MoARD 13/17 No No 84/88 
MoE 16/16 No 2/2 57/57 
MoH 9/9 No 2/2 22/22 
MoTI 24/24 No No 40/44 
ICTDA 0/17 Statement None None 
MoCB 0/32 No No None 
MoFED 0/8 No No None 
MoW 6/6 No No 19/20 
Source: Compiled from MoFED, 2006 
 
Table 3 shows that only MoE and MoH are relatively better in having 
indicators to measure outcome/outputs and inputs of the organisations. 
Except MoE and MoH, all government organisations have not shown the 
inputs, even in terms of budget, needed for achieving the outcomes/outputs. 
Agencies like MoFED, MoCB and ICTDA stated the expected outcomes but 





they had difficulty in clearly identifying the indicators needed to measure 
their performance.  
 
Many of the organisations that have not clearly indicated their outcomes, 
outputs activities and inputs could have expressed, for example, in terms of 
number of projects, systems, coverage of organisations, durations and labour 
hours. For example, if MoFED is planning to introduce a new software to 
control financial activities of government organisations, then the proportion 
of government organisations (or number of government organisations) that 
would be trained and use the new system would becom the output indicator 
and the cumulative proportion of government organistions that use the new 
system would become outcome target of MoFED for the strategic plan 
period. 
 
Accountability of top managers in public organisations 
 
An interview was held with the director of the Economic Development Unit 
in MoFED concerning the existence of performance agr ements with public 
organizations, criteria to compare inter-organisation performance, and the 
consequences of evaluating performance reports. Responses revealed that 
performance agreement is neither practiced nor planned to be practiced;  the 
non-existence of performance criteria to compare th performances of 
public sector organisations; and, the non-existence of any system to reward 
or punish public managers for the performance of their respective public 
agencies. In relation to consequences, MoFED warns the underperforming 
organisations by transferring the unutilised budget to those well performing 
projects/organisations, or by reducing the following year’s budget Apart 
from these less appealing measures or the emphasis on checking whether the 





activities of public organisations comply with the rules and procedures of 
public expenditure, MoFED is not organised with thecapacity to assess the 
performance of public sector managers and check whether they have 
delivered results for the budget they have utilised. Therefore, a management 
group of a public organisation is unaccountable for outcomes/outputs as 
long as it spends according to financial rules and regulations.  
 
In summary, the non-existence of performance agreement between the 
government and different policy implementing agencis, criteria for 
performance comparison and the absence of reward system for good or poor 
management show the break of the accountability link between the 
government and different government agencies in managing performance. 
When we see the bifurcated role of MoFED, the input controlling wing is 
powerful where as its performance management wing does not go beyond 
compiling plans and reports of the performance of public organisations. This 
shows the lack of integrated performance management system and the 
inability of the government to link performance measurement with the 
decision making process. 
 





Figure 1: Organisations involved in Performance Management 
 
Source: Relationships sketched by the authors 
 
Figure 1 illustrates the level of involvement of three organisations in 
managing the performances of a civil service organisation. On one hand, 
each government organisation strives to use the BSC model to plan, monitor 
and evaluate its performance from four perspectives: finance (budget 
utilisation), responsiveness to citizens, internal process and organisational 
learning. On the other hand, MoFED attempts to make civil service 
organisations implement program-based budgeting model starting from 
2011/12.  The MoCS is responsible for preparation of guidelines and 
direction on how to evaluate the performance of civil servants. Therefore, 
this purports that the existing system of performance management is too 





complex because of the involvement of three organisations: the public 
organisation, MoCS and MoFED. 
 
Performance management at organization level 
 
A summary of results of the interview administered to planning/ICT 
department heads of the sample organizations shows (see Table 4) that all 
organizations have started to use the BSC as a performance management 
framework. Except in MoA, the case-study organizations do not practice 
performance agreement at various levels of the organization.  
 
Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development started to use BSC since the 
year 2007 immediately after they implemented BPR.  The ministry had tried 
to cascade the strategic plan of the organisation down to the individual level, 
had made performance agreements between the minister and process 
owners, and between process owners and teams and individuals. According 
to planning head, organisational level BSC is completed and each process in 
the ministry has cascaded its own BSC to individual level. MoFED started 
practicing BSC in the year 2010 to cascade the natio l objectives 
developed in the Growth and Transformation Plan (GTP) of the country. 
 
Interview results from planning/ICT and process/department heads of the 
selected organizations (see Table 4) did not have performance agreement 
(except MoA), criteria for comparison of performance within an 
organization and reward/punishment system. In the case of AATBO and 
WWDSE, the proportion of professional employees who reported that their 
team make performance agreement with their process/d partment/division is 
also less than 50% The highest response is for MoA (76.9%) followed by 





MoWE (58.3%) and MoI (56%) (see Table 5). This purports that all 
government organisations, except MoA, are found at the same stage of 
practicing performance management. 
 
Table 4: Interview results regarding performance planning, agreement and 
reward 
Organisation AATBO MoI WWSDE MoA MoFED 
Is BSC Introduced? Planning 
stage 
No No Yes Yes 
Performance Agreement No No No Yes No 
 
























Frequency of reporting Every 2 
weeks 
Monthly Monthly Quarterly Monthly 
Frequency of meetings weekly Monthly Weekly Monthly Monthly 
 























Source: Own survey 
 
Performance monitoring and evaluation 
 
The authors have also reviewed the annual reports of some government 
organisations and analysed to what extent  the actual performance are 
reported in relation to planned performance and to what extent the processes 
(activities)/input measurement has shifted to results-based performance 
measurement. The findings indicate that government agencies have shifted 
from input/activity reporting to output reporting. We found only the 
marketing division of the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development 
(MoARD) to report in terms of the difference between actual performance 





and planned performance in financial terms. The rest of government 
organisations reported the actual outputs without mentioning the annual plan 
and the input used to obtain the output. This is one sided measurement that 
does not enable organisations to measure their efficiency and effectiveness.  
 
Results of the interview administered with planning/ICT heads in the case-
study organizations (see Table 4) indicates that the different units within the 
organizations submit periodic reports to their respective planning 
departments. The period for reporting ranges between two weeks (in 
AATBO) and a quarter (in MoA). Furthermore, the organizations conduct 
periodic performance monitoring/evaluation meetings at least monthly. 
During these meetings, the respondents also expressed that the complaints 
of clients are raised and discussed during those metings. In all cases, 
feedback is given to the respective organizational u its after the meetings. 
Questionnaire results (from heads) regarding performance agreement, 
performance reports, periodic management meeting and feedbacks are 




RBPM enhances accountability of managers in public organizations and 
their units. However, accountability doesn’t seem to be well developed even 
in MoA, only about 58% of the professional respondents reported that they 
are clear with the consequences of performance evaluation. The proportion 
of such a response for the remaining organizations is less that 50%. 
 


























No 78% 20% 50% 86% 67% 80% 83% 68% 
Yes 22% 80% 50% 14% 33% 20% 17% 32% 





No 33% 33% 0% 0% 38% 0% 6% 15% 
Yes 67% 67% 100% 100% 63% 100% 94% 85% 
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
Clear 
Consequence 
on the Results 
of Evaluation 
No 78% 100% 100% 100% 100% 90% 83% 92% 
Yes 22% 0% 0% 0% 0% 10% 17% 8% 
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
Accountability  No 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 90% 100% 99% 
Yes 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 10% 0% 1% 
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
Source: Own Survey 
 
Note: The composite variable denoting accountability is a product of the 
proportions of responses to three variables (existence of performance 
agreement, evaluation and clarity of consequence of one’s performance.  
 
Accountability in table 5 is a composite result of performance agreement, 
performance evaluation and clear consequence on the results of performance 
evaluation. In general, the result shows that accountability is almost non-




For many years, civil service organizations in Ethiopia used Line-Item 
Budgeting. This system has been criticized for its focus on input control 
rather than on results control. To alleviate the limitations of line-item 





budgeting, MoFED introduced Program Based Budgeting in a few selected 
ministries in the year 2007. However, it failed because of its complexity and 
incompleteness. Consequently, experts from MoFED prepared a new 
manual of program budgeting and started training the experts of federal 
agencies with the aim of implementing the new system starting from July 7, 
2011. The program budgeting contains a three-year estimate of expenditure 
and was assumed to integrate the execution of budget with the strategic plan 
of the organization that was drawn from GTP (Growth and Transformation 
Plan) of the nation. Interview with higher official of planning and budgeting 
in MoFED revealed that successful implementation of Program Based 
Budgeting requires supportive organizational policies and procedures, 
capable HR,  and information systems that support planning, monitoring and 
evaluation of organisational performance. Even thoug  the linkage of 
budget to the strategy of the organisation complements RBPM, it is difficult 
to judge at this time how much the new manual of program budgeting 
compatible with the BSC prepared by respective civil service organizations.  
 
Table 6: Opinion of process/department heads regarding budgeting 
Response AATBO MoI MoWE WWDSE ECSU MoA MoFED 
  n=7 n=9 n=9 n=18 n=9 n=11 n=7 
9. Does your organization allocate budgets to your unit based on annual action plan or 
performance agreement? 
No 86% 89% 33% 44% 44% 9.1% 42.9% 
Yes 14.3 11.11 66.67 55.6 56% 90.9% 57.1% 
Total 100 100 100 100 1 100 100 
10. Do you have the power to manage the budget allocated to your process/division 
No 100% 89% 0% 22.2% 50% 0% 50% 
Yes 0% 11% 100% 77.8% 50% 100% 50% 
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
Source: Own survey 
 





With the exception of MoA, majority of the process/department heads from 
AATBO and MoI respondents expressed that their budgets were not 
prepared based on annual physical plans of their respective 
processes/departments (see Table 6). 55.6%, 56% and 57% of the 
respondents from WWDSE, ECSU and MoFED respectively agreed that 
their budgets were prepared based on their annual physical plan. Table 6 
also indicates all of the respondents form MoA and MoWE; majority of the 
respondents from WWDSE (78%); and, 50% from MoFED and 50% from 
ECSU responded that they have the power to manage the budget allocated to 
their processes/divisions. The opinions of the process managers indicate that 
alignment of budgets with their annual action plan d the power of 
managers to manage their own budgets varies from organisation to 
organisation. The result (see Table 6) shows that allocation of budget based 
on physical plan and the power of managers to manage their own budget 
strongly matches for MOA and for MoWE; In contrast, process/department 
heads in AATBO, MoI, ECSU and MoFED use other means to allocate 
budgets and have weak power to manage their budgets.. The exception of 
MoA indicates that implementation of BSC prior to other civil service 
organisations had positive contribution in improving the capacity of unit 
managers in planning to empowering them to manage their budgets.   
 
Information systems capacity of public organisations 
 
To successfully implement RBPM, public organisations should have an 
effective information system, which facilitates the business operation; 
capture and store data; and, produce summary reports that allow the 
management to measure the gap between actual and plned performance. 





The sampled organisations were evaluated in terms of four areas of 
information systems. 
1. The availability of databases for financial, human, procurement and 
core functions of the organisation 
2. The integration of these databases so that concerned individuals can 
access the data on-line whenever they want to. 
3. The availability of MIS systems that allow management to get 
summarised performance information by identifying the gap between 
the actual and planned performance. 
4. The availability of e-government, which allows employees to share 
data and enhances the capacity of the organisation to link its 
operations with citizens, partners, suppliers etc.  
 
The information provided in Table 7 reveals that all organisations have 
started to use stand-alone and separate data bases for each of the 
organisational functions – finance, human resource, procurement and 
inventory and customers’ service. In the year 2002, no government 
organisation had a single type of database (Tesfaye, 2004). This indicates 
that government organizations have improved their use of computerised 
information systems. Furthermore, all sampled organisations have servers, 
have interconnected their computers, use web sites to convey their mission, 
visions and values to the public. This indicates the readiness of government 
agencies to use ICT to manage performance. Inspite of these facts, 
functional databases are not integrated to allow divisions/ processes, 
employees and stakeholders to share performance data, to manage their 
budgets and to facilitate operations between operations.  
 





As to the MIS, it can be concluded that managers in public organisations 
have improved their skill of identifying performance indicators but are not 
paying attention to the M&E of their performance. As their practice of M&E 
is low there is less interest to use the MIS. 
 
Table 7: ICT status for RBPM 
Systems MOI WWDSE AATBO MoFED MoA 
Financial System partial Partial Partial Yes Partial 
HR Database system partial Partial partial Yes Partial 
Property and Procurement 
Admin. Database system 
No Yes No. Yes partial 
Clients’ Database System Slightly No partial  Partial No 
LAN or Intranet Partial Yes Yes Yes Yes 
MIS No No  No No No 
Source: Own Survey 
 
Leung et al (2006:689-690) stresses the importance of using software in 
implementing BSC, indicating that there are many software packages in the 
market developed for the analytic hierarchy process & the analytic network 
process. This indicates the importance of locally developing or buying 
software for BSC in the public sector in Ethiopia. However, the practice so 
far in this respect is grey. No organisation has so far reported to have 
purchased such software while there was an effort to develop functional 
databases locally. 
 
Challenges of RBPM in the Ethiopian public sector 
 
Based on the responses to the open ended questions, the main challenges of 
implementing RBPMS in the Ethiopian public sector can be summarised as 
follows: 





1. The conflicting instruction coming from regulatory civil service 
agencies: the focus of controlling agencies, (e.g. MoFED and MoCS), 
on inputs/process controls rather than on results control.  
2. Shortage of HR, attitudinal problems of civil service employees, .less 
attractive work environment, poor reward/compensation systems, low 
motivation of hard working people 
3. Limited leadership capacity and commitment towards RBPM, 
shortage of professionals with special knowledge and skills in policy 
advising, result-oriented planning/forecasting, M&E and budgeting; 
lack of experience to plan for results, difficulty in objectively 
measuring results; 
4. Weak systems such as inadequate facility; ambiguous manuals and 
procedures; limited use of ICT, inadequate internet s rvice, weak 
database systems, lack of awareness on the use of MIS to support 
RBPM including result-oriented budgeting, performance agreement, 
ensuring accountability, etc. 
 







RBPMS is unfinished business in the public sector, even in UK and New 
Zealand with rich experience in RBPMS. The developed countries try to 
implement RBPMS cautiously by considering the relaxation of 
input/process control, empowering managers, enhancing accountability, etc., 
in the public sector.  In the case of Ethiopia, the environs of implementing 
RBPMS in the public sector was filled with passion without paying much 
attention to the ups and downs that other countries had gone through.  
 
The government adopted RBPM with the aim of measuring the results of all 
civil service agencies, irrespective of their differences in their missions and 
roles. Some government organisations are regulatory/controlling agencies, 
for example, MoFED and MoCS, and some are policy and strategy 
implementing agencies, e.g. MoA and MoWE. The regulatory/controlling 
agencies focus on how to strengthen their controlling system. In contrast, 
policy implementing agencies try to discharge their responsibilities of 
implementing government policies within the boundary of the financial 
regulation of MoFED and the human resource policies of the MoCS. The 
fundamental issue here is the dilemma of the governm nt between 
empowering managers of public organisations that decide on issues that 
deals with public resources and that affect the livs of many employees and 
citizens; and its interest to strengthen the controlling agencies, for example, 
MoFED, to control the behaviour of its public managers. However, our 
analysis indicates that empowerment of managers may h mper the 
implementation of result based performance management system unless the 
government has the capacity and the system to make public managers 
accountable for their actions. 





In most cases, policy objectives are ambiguous (Wilson, 1989:32-33) that 
are open for different interpretations among politicians and managers 
(McGuire, 2001). This implies that quantifying and measuring the results of 
policy implementing public organizations and regulatory agencies remains 
the major challenges in public sector. For example,  
o How can we measure the results of the NBE? By the number of 
monetary policies developed, or by the amount of money in circulation? 
o How can we measure the results of MoFED? by the number of rules and 
regulations developed or by the effort it exerts to make civil service 
organisations comply to the financial rules and regulations.  
o What kind of results does the management of a governm nt agency 
expect from the administrative and finance support rocesses, which are 
responsible to manage the inputs according to the rules and regulation of 
MoFED and MoCS? 
 
The main challenges of implementing RBPM  in Ethiopia were problem of 
identifying appropriate indicators to measure performance,  Inability to 
integrate the roles between government agencies towards a particular 
agenda, the lack of the capacity of the government to make its public sector 
managers accountable for results, negative attitude an  lack of motivation of 
employees towards the reform effort of the governmet, low capacities in 
management and systems and low retention capacity of civil service 
organisations. 
 







It is important to highlight some measures that should be taken into account 
while implementing RBPM. Top managers are responsible to manage 
organisations, and organisations produce results. Hence; managers are 
accountable for the results of their organisations. Accountability makes 
managers to worry on the challenges they have and to feel responsible for 
assigning the right personnel to the right job, and to coordinate different 
activities within the organisation and outside the organisation to bring the 
desired results. Such kinds of challenges make managers to be adept in 
managing their organisations, improve their communications and 
negotiation skill with employees and stakeholders. Therefore, the 
government is advised not to make the management posi ions permanent 
tenure of few individuals and should make these position  open for 
competition so that competent managers can have the chance to bring new 
ideas and changes to the civil service. 
 
In addition, RBPM cannot be successful unless the gov rnment has effective 
systems that make public sector managers accountable for their actions. To 
do so, the government has to follow the experiences of other countries (refer 
to the literature) and strengthen the capacity of Development Planning and 
Economic Administration Office in MoFED in strategic performance 
management and in monitoring and evaluation of the performances of 
organisations. The results of the performance evaluation produced by this 
office should have consequences on either changing or rewarding the 
management of a particular public organisation.  
 





Finally, this research has been limited only to asses ing the challenges of 
implementing RBPMS in the Ethiopian public sector. From our assessment, 
it can be concluded that result based performance management is not the 
only panacea to measure the performance of all types of organisations, 
processes/divisions and individuals. Results can be outputs, outcomes and 
impact. Outcomes and impact are the results of organisations but rare to be 
that of individual employees. For example, it is possible to measure the 
output of a particular university, for example the number of graduating 
students, but it is difficult to measure the output of an instructor. Likewise, 
for a police department, it is difficult to measure its immediate output but 
easy to measure its impact in the long run, for example reduction of crime 
rate. This is to imply that situational factors such as identifying the type of 
result – output, outcome or impact- is more relevant to measure the 
performance of a particular public sector organisation and to select the right 
control strategy-behaviour control, social control or result based control- to 
manage the public sector organisation. Therefore, the direction of the future 
research would be optimising the type of result expected with that of control 
strategy needed to maximise the performance of a given government 
organisation. 
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